

DISCLAIMER:

This document does not meet the
current format guidelines of
the Graduate School at
The University of Texas at Austin.

It has been published for
informational use only.

Copyright

by

Kathryn Quinn O'Dowd

2017

**The Thesis committee for Kathryn Quinn O'Dowd Certifies that this is the
approved version of the following thesis:**

**Beyond the Spectrum: Understanding Czech Euroscepticism Outside Left-
Right Classification**

APPROVED BY SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Rachel Wellhausen, Supervisor

Mary Neuburger

**Beyond the Spectrum: Understanding Czech Euroscepticism Outside Left-
Right Classification**

By

Kathryn Quinn O'Dowd, B.A.

Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

Of the University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2017

Acknowledgements

There are so many people who have aided in the thesis writing process. First, thank you to all of the professors that I have had over the years, whose courses have either directly or indirectly influenced the development of this work. The office staff at the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies- especially Roy Flores, Jenica Jones, and Agnes Sekowski- have been an enormous support. Christian Hilchey, thank you for your Czech instruction over the last two years. Martin Někola, thank you for your advice on how to conduct research in the Czech Republic, as well as connecting me with many of the researched parties. Mary Neuburger, thank you for reading my drafts and providing feedback throughout the process. Most importantly I need to thank my advisor Rachel Wellhausen, without whose guidance this project would have failed miserably. Finally to my family- Skipper, Pippin, Carrick, Kathy and Patrick O'Dowd, thank you for your years of support, it means the world to me.

Beyond the Spectrum: Understanding Czech Euroscepticism Outside Left-Right Classification

by

Kathryn Quinn O'Dowd, M.A.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2017

SUPERVISORS: Rachel Wellhausen

Commonly known as Euroscepticism, critical views of the European Union have grown significantly in the thirteen years since the Czech Republic joined the EU. Especially in light of the United Kingdom's recent vote to leave the EU, it is imperative that we understand Euroscepticism across member-states. The Czech Republic is an important place to contextualize Euroscepticism due to its history as a post-communist state. Euroscepticism occurs both on the left and right ends of the political spectrum in the Czech Republic, as such there needs to be a more holistic picture of the factors that influence adoption of a Eurosceptic platform. This study looks at factors beyond a party's position on the left-right spectrum—such as party age, level of education, and urban/rural divide—in an effort to better understand which parties in the Czech Republic are the most likely to develop Eurosceptic platforms. While rural and less educated citizens are more likely to be Eurosceptic, party elites tend to overrule popular opinions in the development of party platforms. Age of the party, however, has a strong correlation with a party's likelihood of being Eurosceptic. Newer parties are more likely than older ones of adopting Eurosceptic platforms, thus presents strong evidence for the growing permanence of Euroscepticism within the Czech party system.

Table of Contents

Literature Review.....	1-13
Research Proposal and Hypotheses.....	13-19
Methods.....	20-21
Evidence.....	22-49
Conclusion.....	49-52
Appendix.....	53
References.....	54-57

List of Tables

Table 1.....	22-24
Table 2.....	43

List of Figures

Figure 1.....	25
Figure 2.....	25

List of Maps

Map 1.....	47
------------	----

Euroscepticism and the Czech Republic

On May 1st, 2004 the Czech Republic joined the European Union, making it one of the first post-communist states to do so. Since the end of communism in 1989, gaining EU membership was a major project of political elites (Baun et al. 2006; Riishoj 2007; Esparza 2010). The public generally supported this push towards membership as joining the EU was seen as a critical step in erasing negative associations of communism. In the thirteen years since the Czech Republic joined the EU much has changed both domestically and internationally in terms of how the EU is perceived, as parties across the right- left spectrum have become more uncertain of the EU (Havlík 2011). In the Czech Republic, opponents of the EU have emerged in all levels of society. This phenomenon is best exemplified by Former President Václav Klaus, who is an outspoken critic of the EU.

In the Czech Republic, Euroscepticism is found across the political spectrum; far-left KSČM, far-right Úsvit and more centrist leaders such as Klaus have all expressed Eurosceptic beliefs. As a result, this study will investigate other factors as they relate to a party's Eurosceptic stance. Working from the following literature this research will examine which factors help predict a party's likelihood of Euroscepticism. The 2013 Presidential Election provides a critical case study, as it demonstrated both a clear rural/urban divide in party platforms as well as competition between two parties that had been founded less than five years prior to the election. This study hypothesizes that newer political parties, rural-based political parties, and parties with less educated bases are all more likely to be Eurosceptic. This project demonstrates that while rural and less educated voters are more likely to be Eurosceptic, this is not always reflected in party leadership. Newer parties, however, are more likely to be Eurosceptic as a whole. This study contributes to the existing literature on Euroscepticism by providing a more holistic

understanding of the development of Eurosceptic platforms in Czech political parties. The first section of this thesis will provide background and context for a study of Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic. Section two will discuss hypotheses in detail with supporting literature. Section three will provide evidence for these hypotheses; beginning with an analysis of voting programs, followed by interview data, and a case study of the 2013 presidential election. The final section provides conclusion and summary of the findings of this study.

Background

Theory

Euroscepticism was developed by Paul Taggart as a way to explain growing debates about the legitimacy of the EU (1998). Broadly defined, Euroscepticism is a critical view of European integration. Over the past two decades Euroscepticism has grown, as the EU itself becomes increasingly politicized (Hooghe and Marks 2008; de Wilde and Zürn 2012). This politicization is a reaction to the growing authority of the EU (de Wilde and Zürn 2012). Euroscepticism first appeared in public discourse with the difficulties in passing the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s (Szczurbiak and Taggart 2008). Prior to the 1990s, the EU was in a period of ‘permissive consensus,’ a time in which EU changes were made by-and-large without contestation. Scholars such as Usherwood and Startin look at the failure of the Maastricht Treaty as a particular tipping point in ensuring that Eurosceptic debates were present in public discussions moving forward. Trouble in passing the Maastricht Treaty “alerted publics to the fact that European integration was diluting national sovereignty,” prior to the treaty the public were generally not concerned with the implication of EU membership on their daily lives (Hooghe and Marks 2008, 21).

The Czech Republic joined the EU in 2004, more than ten years after the end of ‘permissive consensus.’ Whereas during the period of ‘permissive consensus’ membership was assumed among member-states, the difficulties with the Maastricht Treaty as well as the incorporation of new member-states meant that citizens learned to think of the EU in more contentious, political terms. As the Czech Republic, because of its communist past, had to reform itself in order to be considered for membership, membership in the EU always had a political connotations in Czech society. This may help explain why in recent years the Czech Republic has been such a fruitful ground for Euroscepticism.

Euroscepticism can be classified as either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ (Taggart 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008). ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism refers to complete rejection of EU membership, whereas ‘Soft’ Eurosceptics support EU membership, but are critical of various aspects of integration. These categories developed as a response to the fact that the EU is criticized in a variety of ways with varying levels of intensity. The idea of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ can be problematic in that they oversimplify views on the EU; because platforms on the EU exist on a spectrum from fully rejecting the EU to completely supportive of its policies, describing Eurosceptic views as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ is a generalization of Euroscepticism.

Parties often gain the label of ‘Eurosceptic’ for even the slightest criticism of the EU, Neumayer critiques the ways in which that parties have been defined as Eurosceptic as being overly inclusive and ignoring the historical transformations of political parties’ positions on the EU in post-communist states (2008). Neumayer explains that Euroscepticism has been used in post-communist states as both a means to include or exclude other parties, and as a means for mainstream parties to differentiate themselves. This is helpful in understanding the limitations of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ definitions of Euroscepticism. Indeed they were developed in 1998, a full

six years before the Czech Republic (or any other post-communist state) would join the EU. In examining political parties' understanding of the EU and applying Euroscepticism as a theoretical framework, it is important to take into account the time in which the theory was first developed. In his original work on Euroscepticism, Taggart claims that it is a fringe movement without any real place in government (1998). Increasingly, however, across Europe Eurosceptic parties are being elected to government positions. Thus this study provides a more nuanced understanding of what makes a party Eurosceptic.

Kopecky and Mudde critique these over simplistic categories by proposing a two-dimensional system to better articulate party ideologies (2002). Of the four candidate states surveyed in their study (Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic), the Czech Republic was the most Eurosceptic overall, with both higher levels of public Euroscepticism and more representation of Eurosceptic parties. Usherwood and Startin also attempt to provide nuance to the 'hard' and 'soft' categories by identifying four types of political parties when it comes to Euroscepticism; single-issue pro-sovereignty parties, radical right parties, non-traditional far-left parties (KSČM), and 'soft Eurosceptic' parties (2013). These categories then provide an important foundation for this study; there are many types of Eurosceptic parties across the political spectrum, as such it should be investigated which factors these parties share. Furthermore, Usherwood and Startin argue that these 'soft Eurosceptic' parties are becoming increasingly embedded in European societies (2013). However, the identification of a party as 'soft' Eurosceptic is tricky because it seems that any party could take issue with some aspect of the EU. This presents a problem in the division between academic definitions of Euroscepticism and the ways in which parties employ the term.

Brief Overview of Modern Czech History

In order to understand why EU membership is contested uniquely in the Czech Republic, it is important to highlight a few key points in Czech history. Historically the Czechs have been defined in relation for foreign rule (Riishøj 2007). Between 1620 and 1918 the Czech lands were under the control of the Hapsburg Monarchy. During this time German was the language of learning and government in the Czech lands (Anderson 1983). In reaction to German dominance, activists such as Josef Dobrovský and Josef Jungmann advocated revival the Czech language. Thus language was used as a means to distinguish Czech identity in relation to foreign rulers (Anderson 1983).

Between the two World Wars, the First Czechoslovak Republic was created under the leadership of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. This period is mythologized even today in the Czech imagination as a time of freedom. During this time Czechoslovakia advanced into one of the most industrialized countries in the world (Krejčí and Machonin 1998). This was not to last, as the Nazis occupied Bohemia and Moravia in 1939. The Soviets liberated Prague in 1945 and in 1948 the communist coup made Czechoslovakia into a Soviet satellite state.

During the late 1960s in an effort to create ‘socialism with a human face,’ the Czechoslovak government relaxed restrictions on speech. As a result of these reforms Czechoslovakia was invaded by the USSR. Known as the Prague Spring, these events reinforced Czech solidarity in the face of oppression (Williams 1997). Although after invasion until the end of communism in 1989 Czechoslovakia faced harsh repercussions for their actions, this oppression emphasized the “symbolic power of the martyr in Czech constructs of identity” (Williams 1997, 190). In response to the reforms of the 1960s, the Soviets doubled down on restrictions on speech and expression. This period, known as *normalization*, is one in which writers and dissidents made use of the *samizdat*—independent, illegal underground publishing—

to distribute their works. During the normalization of the 1970s the political writings of the future President of Czechoslovakia (and later Czech Republic), Václav Havel first rose to prominence. In his classic work *Power of the Powerless*, Havel advocates for a society that supports the freedom of the individual to live in their own truth, yet also expresses skepticism in the liberating powers of Western-style democracy (1979). This optimism, however, is contrasted by a long history of collaboration—from those Czechs who collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War to those who were complicit with the communist regime in order to survive (Bryant 2009). Indeed Chad Bryant’s study points to collaboration as a means by which Czechs were able to preserve their identity during the Nazi occupation (Bryant 2009). Just as there is a long tradition of resistance in the Czech consciousness, the history of collaboration may also lead to skepticism, such as that exemplified by figures like Klaus.

After the fall of communism in 1989, Czechoslovak (and after 1993, Czech) leaders pushed for entrance to the EU. In 1993, Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia occurred as a result of Czech and Slovak politicians differing views of future of their nation, as well as the uneven growth of the Czech and Slovak economies. While Czechs laud this so-called “Velvet Divorce” for its peaceful example of the states’ dissolution, it also served to move the Czechs further towards the West. The Czech state no longer shared a border with the former Soviet Union, thus placing it even more firmly into the Western tradition. In the wake of this, leaders like President Havel campaigned hard for EU membership (Riishøj 2007). The hope of this campaign was that through entry into the European community, the Czech Republic could rid itself of its communist past. Czech elites constructed Czech identity in light what they viewed as their historical place in Europe. The national history

of the Czech Republic was therefore viewed as one that was firmly situated in Western Europe (Riishøj 2007; Esparza 2010).

The present situation in the Czech Republic in many ways reflects the past. While they are not directly under the rule of another power, many Czechs feel dominated by larger EU nations (Esparza 2010). This is especially true of Germany as the Czechs already have negative historical associations with Germanic peoples who dominate EU decision-making. Riishøj questions to what levels the identities of Czech and European can co-exist. Many Czechs see their national identity as having been defined from the outside; their first period of national ‘awakening’ came during Hapsburg rule (2007). Criticisms of the EU bring up this historical threat of collaboration, these historical periods in which the Czech lands were under the rule of a foreign power and Czechs had to make concessions to survive. This is reflected in the many criticisms of the EU that depict the Czech Republic as the pawn of the West. Thus EU encroachment on domestic issues is seen by Czechs to reflect these times of foreign rule. There is a feeling of lost sovereignty as a result of EU membership (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Euroscepticism symbolically reasserts lost autonomy. By its very nature membership means that any member-state will have to give up certain aspects of self-governance in order to fully participate. Eurosceptics are able to tap into these nationalistic sentiments in order to gain support for their cause, whether or not the loss of sovereignty is real or imagined.

As Eurosceptic debates gain prominence in the public spheres, it is important to remember the issues of national identity that Eurosceptic actors tap into. Greater policy input on the European level implies a greater loss of sovereignty on a national level, thus such dissent should be expected as the EU becomes more integrated. This long history of foreign rule undoubtedly contributes to constructions of Europe in the Czech Republic and shapes the way

that they perceive other member states. As a smaller state, Czech citizens may feel that they are less influential in EU decision-making (Magnetite and Nicolaidis 2004). The associations with EU membership may be different for post-communist states as opposed to Western European states (Tucker et al., 2002).

EU Power

The enlargement of the EU likely contributes to the growth of Euroscepticism. In 2004, the Czech Republic (along with Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) was added to the EU in its largest single expansion. Such an expansive enlargement inherently changes the make-up of the EU, incorporating different states that may have an entirely different idea of what it means to be part of the European community. Furthermore, eight of these new member states (including the Czech Republic) were former members of the Eastern Bloc.

Many post-communist states spent much of the 1990s and early 2000s working towards EU membership. EU membership was seen as beneficial not only in terms of politics, but also because it was a way for post-communist states to repair their image (Bardi et al. 2002). This demonstrates how membership, even from the beginning, was seen differently in Central and Eastern Europe. In contrast to earlier member states that saw EU membership as a matter-of-course due to their geography, association with the EU had major political implications for states that were trying to reform their image after the fall of communism.

In the Czech Republic this campaign for EU membership was known as a ‘return to Europe’ (Esparza 2010). This so-called ‘return to Europe’ demonstrates the political dimension of being European for post-communist states. Through the legitimizing nature of EU membership, the Czech Republic could ensure its place in democratic Europe. Since EU

membership had a significant symbolic meaning for Czechs, in the campaign for membership, the optics were often more important than the actual implications of EU membership. Czech voters were not heavily influenced by the campaign for EU membership; they were, rather, cued by established positive associations with 'Europe.' Anti-communism was used to frame a 'yes' vote for entry into the EU. The campaign for membership included both low levels of public knowledge and high levels of elite contention as to the benefits of membership (Hanley 2004). However, Hanley notes that these were still debates "around" rather than "about" membership, as even Klaus, a known critic of the EU, failed to formerly oppose or support membership (2004). The lack to substantive debates as to whether or not the Czech Republic should actually join the EU likely contributed to low levels of public knowledge. Indeed the campaign was simply called *Ano*, yes in Czech, basically telling voters to vote yes to Europe. Hanley concludes that the most likely reason why the *Ano* campaign was successful was not because of the effective campaign or the public's knowledge of the positive effects of EU membership, but rather because of positive imagery of Western Europe and the belief that joining the EU would allow the Czech Republic to become part of Western Europe (2004).

In the wake of the fall of communism it was difficult for political strategists to mobilize constituencies, because they had long been suppressed, this lack of formalized groups contributes to weak party institutionalization in Central and Eastern Europe (Innes 2002). The Czech Republic (as well as Slovakia) attempted to use the transition from communism to capitalism to create political identities (Innes 2002). Partially due to weak party stability in Central and Eastern Europe, voters in the referendum were cued more by individual political actors rather than by parties. One advantage of this is that political parties in post-communist states often do not carry the same baggage as similar parties in Western Europe due to their newness. Because

parties in post-communist states do not have core constituencies, they are not held to the same level of accountability that Western European states hold their party members (Innes 2002).

Others such as Lyons, and Tverdova and Anderson have asserted that it was in fact the economy that was a major motivator for voters in choosing EU membership. In Lyons' study of voter opinions of EU entry, economics are shown to have a larger pull on Czech voters than party ideologies. Lyons contrasts this with Western European states where party loyalties are stronger. The study concludes that moving forward into membership economic factors will continue to play a strong role in determining public support for the EU (Lyons 2007). Tverdova and Anderson also assert that people do not vote for membership simply based on support for the West, but rather a mixture of economic and practical concerns (2004). While they find that economics were more powerful than parties in determining voter support for EU entry, parties played an important role in providing the public information on the benefits of EU membership (Tverdova and Anderson 2004). Lyons makes this an either-or-issue, when, in fact, the economy and the positive image of 'Europe' are connected. As Tverdova and Anderson demonstrate, economic and party-based decisions are not separate from each other. People voted based on the fact they believed that joining the EU would bolster their economy, but also because the positive imagery that membership presented.

There are many factors that may influence the growth of Euroscepticism, but one of the most significant is the expansion of the EU's authority into domestic matters. Critics have said that there is a 'democratic deficit' in the governing of the EU, however, Moravcsik is critical of this evaluation of the EU (2002). Moravcsik assesses what people call the 'democratic deficit' in the European Union. Because the EU does not have the enforcing powers to ensure that all of their policies are enacted, much of the actual policy enforcement is left to domestic governments.

Technological advances have also served to create the illusion that the EU is expanding exponentially. Because of the access the new technology provides, people feel closer to the EU than ever before, thus they feel as if it is playing a larger role in daily life, even if this is not the case.

Euroscepticism and the Public

Another factor contributing to debate about the EU is the public's involvement. Early efforts to create a European project in the 1950s occurred, by-and-large without strong public engagement, but since 1992 the public have become much more invested in EU policy (Fuchs et al. 2009). As a result of growing public concern referendums are increasingly used in deciding whether or not to implement EU policy. Although in theory these referendums should assuage public concerns about the elite control of the EU, it has shown to further Eurosceptic viewpoints (Usherwood and Startin 2013). Referendums more acutely cue the public into the actions of the EU. Whereas the EU previously existed only in the background of daily life, referendums serve as a reminder of the impact of the EU on daily life. Additionally the public has grown more Eurosceptic and new technologies, make it harder to ignore them (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). Average citizens, through access to the Internet and social media, are able to express their beliefs on a large-scale, thus amplifying their voice. According to the November 2016 Eurobarometer poll, when asked "In general, does the European union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image?" 26% of those surveyed maintained 'fairly positive' image of the EU, compared with 23% who held a 'fairly negative' view, 39% had a 'neutral view', 9% of those surveyed had 'very negative,' while only 2% of those surveyed had 'very positive'. This is consistent with the same poll conducted in November 2015, but a large departure from November 2014 where 34% of those surveyed had 'fairly positive image,'

and only 17% had ‘fairly negative.’ This spike in negative views after November 2014 may be tied with large EU-wide issues such as the handling of the Syrian refugee situation and how it was perceived in the Czech Republic. This, coupled with the growing number of successful Eurosceptic candidates, means that Euroscepticism has a stronger foothold in Czech society than ever before. As there is a greater capacity for communication between elites and the public through the internet, the public has a greater platform from which to express discontent. Furthermore these polls demonstrate the dividedness of views on the EU in the Czech Republic. It not just that people have grown more critical of the EU, but they have developed stronger opinions on all sides about the EU (Usherwood and Starton 2013). These divided views makes space for parties across the political spectrum to adopt both strong pro-European or Eurosceptic views.

There is debate as to whether Euroscepticism is a top-down or a bottom-up phenomenon. Previous studies have found that while people are often active in stating their disdain for the EU, they still tend to elect non-Eurosceptic parties (Spanje and Vreese 2011). However, the successes of more skeptical politicians such as Presidents Klaus and Zeman suggest otherwise in the Czech context. While people express negative opinions about the EU, they are typically ill informed as to its functions. Lack of familiarity with the EU’s processes coupled with increasing visibility of the EU appear to be a bad combination for positive public perception of the EU.

Euroscepticism may be more common among citizens because there are no widely consumed pan-European news sources, all information that the public consumes concerning EU issues are inherently filtered through nationalistic lenses (Daddow 2006). This trend is interesting in light of the increasingly integrated media landscape. Fewer and fewer international groups now own more and more news sources. In the Czech Republic, international companies

own many of the major media outlets. The most widely read daily in the Czech Republic is *Blesk*, a tabloid which often focuses on the lives and scandals of the famous (Trampota 2017). There is distance between citizens and Brussels, so citizens must depend on a source such as the news for goings on in the EU. Furthermore Daddow discusses the fact that because there is no widely accepted definition on Euroscepticism in practice. It seems as if the accepted terminology in academia to describe Euroscepticism is not necessarily the same Euroscepticism that political actors are referring to. Again this demonstrates the problematic nature of defining Euroscepticism.

Research Proposal and Hypotheses

As the previous literature has demonstrated, Euroscepticism is on the rise both in the Czech Republic and Europe as a whole. Inspired by this situation, this research seeks to uncover which factors make political parties most likely to adopt Eurosceptic platforms in the Czech context. Furthermore, as explained in the previous section, the public have become more involved in Eurosceptic debates, thus this study hypothesizes that the demographic make-up of a party will have a strong relationship with that party's likelihood of being Eurosceptic. Parties with constituencies that have demonstrated a greater frequency of Euroscepticism should be overall more Eurosceptic than parties made-up of members who are typically more pro-European.

Historically, voters in post-communist states have a positive perception of the EU, largely due to its perceived economic benefits. Although people in post-communist states have positive associations with the EU, there is still lower voter participation. Pop-Eleches and Tucker examine what may be contributing to low voter turn out in post-communist states (2012). They conclude that lower civic participation is limited to those who lived through communism, and

purport that lower levels of participation will remain with those generations. The legacy of communism on voters is also explained by Pop-Eleches and Tucker in a 2011 study, which found that exposure to communist regimes results in less enthusiasm for democratic and economic reforms. In light of this combination of weak party institutionalization, low civic participation, and strong Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, the political party is an important place to study the growth of Euroscepticism.

As Euroscepticism is found both on the left and right ends of the political spectrum, this study seeks to uncover other factors that help indicate a party's likelihood to adopt Eurosceptic platforms. Historically Euroscepticism is found in parties on both the far-right and far-left ends of the ideological spectrum. Although Conti finds a more longstanding tradition of the far-right and Euroscepticism, in the Czech Republic the far-left has a much longer history of Euroscepticism. In the 2003 campaign for EU membership, only the Communist Party (KSČM) opposed membership to the EU. The main purpose of this study is to demonstrate how factors, beyond a party's position on the left-right spectrum, need to be looked at in order to form a clearer picture as to which kinds of parties are the most likely to be Eurosceptic. As a result of the presence of Euroscepticism across the spectrum, other factors that may influence the adoption of Eurosceptic platforms need to be taken into consideration:

H1: Newer political parties are more likely to develop Eurosceptic platforms.

Because the Czech Republic has low levels of party permanence, new parties are more successful than in Western European states. While, a large number of EU citizens are critical of the EU, in recent years citizens have become more active in voicing their opinions on EU issues and newer political parties without established platforms are able to capitalize on this. Overall

established, mainstream parties tend to be more pro-EU, while parties on the margins are more likely to express Eurosceptic voices (Spanje and Vreese 2011). As has been stated, however, Euroscepticism plays an increasingly central role in Czech politics. One explanation for this is the emergence of successful new Eurosceptic parties.

Although there is overall weak party institutionalization in Central and Eastern Europe, some parties are able to maintain longevity. In the Czech Republic, three parties, the Communist Party (KSČM), the Christian and Democratic Union (KDU-ČSL), and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), do have stronger attachments (Vlachova 2001). Vlachova speculates that this may lead to a more stabilized party competition in the future. This article does not speak well to the strength of new parties that we are currently seeing in the Czech Republic. With only a few parties well established in the system, there is space for new parties. The growing popularity of Euroscepticism is further facilitated by new Eurosceptic parties.

There is weak party institutionalization overall in Central and Eastern Europe, largely due to communist one-party rule for the majority of the 20th century. One result of this weak institutionalization is that party extinction is much more likely. Thus parties need to appeal more strongly to voters, as voters do not have as strong of historical ties to their parties as they may have in other parts of Europe. Also this means that party ideologies are not as static. Resulting from this, incumbents are much less likely to be reelected in post-communist states than their western counterparts (Bernhard and Karakoc 2011). This greater risk of extinction or getting voted out of office means that parties and political actors in these states need a salient issue in order to gain support.

When it comes time to make electoral decisions, most voters do not make their decisions based on all of the political parties on the ballot, but rather narrow it to a smaller group of parties

based on their preferences (Mateju and Vlachova 1998). A Left-wing socio-economic value does not inevitably result in support for the left-wing party. This demonstrates the need for both powerful messaging and strong political figures in order to attract voters in Central and Eastern Europe. If ideology is not always the determinant of voter behavior, then the party must be persuasive in other ways in order to ensure a vote. Newer political parties may be easier able to capitalize on the lack of party stability through persuasive Eurosceptic platforms.

Parties in Central and Eastern Europe were by-and large oriented positively towards the EU prior to membership, however in the past ten years, that orientation has not been as uniform. Prior to EU entry, there was by-and-large consensus among most political parties as to the benefits of EU membership, excepting Communist Party, which was a major political outsider at the time. There is no longer consensus; the EU is a means by which parties can distinguish themselves. A party's participation in the government, however, has a positive effect on that party's position on European integration, as such newer parties that have less experience working with government may be more likely to be Eurosceptic (Havlik 2011).

The growth of the EU has altered the way that parties orient themselves around EU issues, as parties have become increasingly concerned with European matters. This also ends up affecting the parties' domestic platforms as well as they are now more concerned with how the EU affects national policy (Baun et al. 2006). The extent to which political parties are 'Europeanized,' or supportive of the EU, is related to how deeply that party is working in the government (Havlik and Vykoupilova 2008). Parties who are strongly represented in government are more likely to present positive views of the EU. Parties without an established history use the issue of European integration to establish themselves. Thus it would make sense that parties that have existed in the system over time have developed a more positive attitude towards the EU.

H2: Political parties with rural bases are more likely to develop Eurosceptic platforms.

Because those living in larger population centers are typically closer to government, both physically and relationally, they are more likely to have direct interactions with government officials and institutions. In light of this urbanites are more likely to develop more positive associations with government institutions. Resulting from this distance, political parties with more rural bases are likelier than urban parties to develop Eurosceptic platforms. Surwillo et al.'s study of Eurosceptic attitudes in Poland found that those most likely to be Eurosceptic were living in rural communities (2010). The Czech Republic is comparable in many ways to Poland-similar histories in the 20th century, culminating with both joining the EU in 2004. As such, this finding likely holds true for the Czech Republic as well.

Although the public has become more vocal in voicing their opinions on European issues, the EU remains, by and large, an elite project. While the public is more connected with what is going on in Brussels through social media and other technologies, this does not always translate into greater influence in EU decision-making. The public is proverbially included more in the decision-making processes via the implementation of referendums, but the EU by-and-large remains controlled by the few in office. Political actors who have less influence in the affairs of the state are more likely to express views critical of the EU and thus are able to connect with rural Eurosceptic populations. The distance, both physical and personal, of those living in rural environments. This study hypothesizes that the general rural preference for Euroscepticism will be reflected in Eurosceptic party membership.

H3: Political parties with less educated constituencies are more likely to develop Eurosceptic platforms.

It has been well observed that those with lower levels of education are more skeptical of the EU (Hakhverdian et al. 2013); this study purports that this is true on the party level as well. Parties that are made up of less educated individuals are more likely to have platforms critical of the EU, reflective of the general educational divide in views of the EU. The demographics of who in the citizenry are likely to oppose the EU may have changed since the Czech Republic became a member state (Tucker et al. 2002). Tucker et al. found that more educated people were more likely to oppose EU membership or abstain from voting in the EU referendum. This study hypothesizes that these findings are not consistent with the current landscape of who in the population opposes membership. Tucker's study was conducted before membership and those that opposed membership were already quite a small group within general population. Hakverdian et al.'s study suggests that less educated people are more influenced by campaigns from political parties and as every major party (except the communists) supported membership, it would make sense that membership was widely supported across all levels of education (2013).

Hakverdian et al. argue that less educated people are more likely to take their voting cues from political parties, but that Eurosceptic parties are most often found on the fringes (2013) In the Czech Republic, however, Eurosceptic parties are competitive in elections, as has been demonstrated with the successes of parties such as SPO and ODS. While the in the Czech Republic there is almost universal access to secondary education, mobility in terms of tertiary education in the Czech Republic were the lowest of the countries surveyed in the 2012 OECD poll. Thus the majority of Czechs surveyed (66%) attain the same level of education as their parents, while only 21% attain a higher level of education. Dissatisfaction with lack of social mobility may contribute to a feeling of skepticism with the government as a whole.

There is some correlation between rural populations and access to higher education, due to the fact that most Czech universities are located in larger cities (Franta and Guzi 2008). Franta and Guzi found that those living in closer proximity to a university have a greater chance of achieving higher education (2008). While there is some correlation, education and rural/urban divide will be treated by this project as two distinct categories. More demographic information would be needed in order to deal with populations that have both of these characteristics and the frequency of their combination. Further research may delve more into the nuanced picture of voters who may be less educated and rural, or less educated and urban, however, for the purposes of this study these two categories will be treated as distinct.

Alternative Hypothesis:

AH1: Political parties may be generating fears about the EU in order to gain membership/votes.

This study focuses largely on the impact that membership has on a party's platforms, however, this alternative hypothesis suggests that Euroscepticism is engineered more from the top. Another explanation for why parties are adopting Eurosceptic platforms is that they are fanning the flames of fears held by citizens. Because of the post-communist context of states such as the Czech Republic, there is a great distrust that goes in to electoral decision-making (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). This could be why countries such as the Czech Republic have a reputation for Euroscepticism. Former communist states with more democratic liberties were more likely to express distrust in political parties, than those with fewer democratic liberties (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2011). Political parties may be capitalizing, and even encouraging, this distrust.

Methods

This project was accomplished both through interviews with party workers and analysis of voting programs. Interviews with party-workers took place both in-person in Prague and via Skype. All interviews were conducted in August 2016. Parties were selected from the top ten performing parties from the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. The Party of Civic Rights (SPO), although not one of the top ten performing parties, was also chosen, as it is the party of current President Miloš Zeman. Participants were contacted through emails found on party websites and through contacts already known by the researcher. Interviews were conducted with representatives from Úsvit, TOP 09, KDU-ČSL, and the Green Party. These parties represent Eurosceptic and pro-European platforms, as well as representation from both old and new parties. Although not every party studied in this project was interviewed, these parties are important in painting a more nuanced picture of the influence that constituents have on the development of Eurosceptic platforms. The diversity of this sample is important demonstrating how parties interact with constituents across the spectrum.

The target population of this research was non-elected party workers, as they can speak well to the development of policy. Participants were asked a series of open-ended interview questions. Topics covered during the interviews include questions about party make-up, party platforms, the European Union, and Euroscepticism. The goal of this being both to shape the conversation, but allow for natural connections that the interviewee's minds about the European Union and Euroscepticism. Interviews were conducted in English, so all interviewees were fluent, but not native, English speakers. This qualitative approach seeks to better understand the motivations behind why and how parties engage with increasingly Eurosceptic populations.

Furthermore, as a connector between Brussels and constituents, it is critical to conduct interviews on the party level.

In order to supplement information obtained through interviews, information was also collected from each party's website, with particular attention paid to the most recent voting program section on the party's stance towards the European Union. Party materials also include information found through the Manifesto Project, an online database of party manifestos. The search of manifestos was narrowed to Czech parties since 2004 (the year of accession) and searched for all documents mentioning the EU (*Evropská unie*).

Name	Eurosceptic	Year Founded	Ideology	Demographics	Education
ANO	‘soft’ Eurosceptic—opposes further European integration (6)	2012 ¹	Center-right; Populism (6)	Urban/Bohemia ²	High school ³
TOP 09	No; pro-European with the understanding that there can be reform within structure of EU (3)	2009 ¹	Center-right (6)	Urban/ Bohemia ⁴	University, highly educated ³
Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD)	No; pro-European integration, including entry into the Eurozone (2)	1878 ¹	Center-left (5)	Rural ⁵	High school ³
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)	Yes; historically opposed EU entry in 2004, but lately have not loudly advocated for withdrawal from the EU like other parties (9)	1989 ¹	Far-left (1)	Suburban/Rural ⁶	High school education ³
Christian and	No; pro-European	1919 ¹	Center-right (6)	Rural ⁴	University; highly

¹ Information obtained from party websites

² Havlik and Voda 2016

³ Povolný 2014

⁴ Information obtained from interviews

⁵ Mareš and Pšeja 2007

⁶ Tavits 2013

Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (KDU-ČSL)	with the understanding that there can be reform within structure of EU (3)				educated ³
Civic Democratic Party (ODS)	Slightly; believes that relationship needs to be questioned, but opposed further Eastern influence (7)	1991 ¹	Center-right (5)	Suburban ²⁶	University; highly educated ³
Party of Free Citizens (Svobodní)	Yes; Believe that there are alternatives to citizenship, look to examples of Switzerland and Norway (10)	2009 ¹	Far-right (10)	Urban/Suburban ⁴	N/A
Czech Pirate Party (Piráti)	Slightly; support the Czech Republic's involvement with the EU for some issues, but support reassigning others back to national and local levels (6)	2009 ¹	Center (5.5)	Urban/ Suburban ¹⁷	N/A
Green Party (SZ)	No; pro-European with the understanding that there can be reform	1989 ¹	Center-Left, more right-leaning than other European Greens on security	Urban ⁴	University; highly educated ³⁴

⁷ Burkart 2014

	within structure of EU (2)		issues (4)		
Dawn of Direct Democracy (Úsvit)	Yes; supports a full withdrawal from the EU (10)	2013 ¹	Far-right (10)	Urban/ Suburban ⁴	N/A
Party of Civic Rights (SPO)	Yes (8.5)	2009 ¹	Center-left (4)	Rural ⁸	N/A

Table 1

⁸ Kaniok 2014




Figure 1




Figure 2: All circled points represent parties interviewed; SZ, TOP 09, KDU-ČSL, and Úsvit. All parties in the shaded area have some level of Euro-sceptic platform.

Evidence

The proceeding table and graphics serve as a guide to the evidence presented below; parties on the chart are listed in order of the percentage of the vote that they received in the 2014 European Parliament election. All parties, except for SPO, were selected because they were the top ten performing parties in the 2014 election. SPO was chosen because it is the party of the current Czech President, Miloš Zeman. The table was compiled with information obtained through interviews, analysis of party platforms, and existing demographic research. Based on this information it was determined whether or not a party was Eurosceptic as well as where that party fell on the left-right spectrum. Each party was assigned a number value from 1 (pro-European) to 10 (Eurosceptic), as well as 1 (far-left) to 10 (far-right) this data was then used to create the graph labeled “Euroscepticism and the Left-Right Spectrum.” Rankings were determined after reading existing literature, conducting interviews, and reading party platforms. Numbers were subjectively assigned by the researcher in order to represent how the left-right spectrum and Euroscepticism interact. Parties with more extreme platforms on either issue were given either a higher or lower score, corresponding with their party policy. Every party represented in the shaded area of the graph possesses some level of Eurosceptic platform, demonstrating the presence of Euroscepticism across the political spectrum.

Party Materials

Ano

Ano supports the EU in their 2013 manifesto, claiming that the EU, along with NATO and the UN are the best partners for the Czech Republic’s interests (*Evropská unie, NATO, OSN jsou nejvhodnějším partnerem pro prosazování našich zájmů*). However, Ano is also opposed to

further integration. Ano is a newer party; as such their ‘soft’ Eurosceptic stance supports the hypothesis that newer parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic. While they do not support a full withdrawal from the EU like some of the more ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties, they are opposed to further European integration. They are also a party with lower levels of education, which supports the hypothesis that parties with lower levels of education are typically Eurosceptic.

Although not a hardline Eurosceptic party it should be noted that Ano, which considers itself to be more of a movement than a formal party, was founded by Andrej Babiš in 2009 to challenge the existing government. Ano (which is the Czech word for yes) also serves as an acronym for Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (*Akce nespokojených občanů*).

TOP 09

TOP 09’s 2013 voting program expresses that criticism of the EU is healthy for membership and that it should not be equated with a desire to leave. This effort in the first paragraph of the international politics section of their voting program suggests the importance of the issue and the desire to be clear about where they stand on the issue of Euroscepticism. This is supported by the interview with a worker from TOP 09, who stated that telling voters that you are Euro-optimist is like telling voters not to vote for you. TOP 09’s pro-European platforms confront the hypothesis that newer parties are more likely to develop Eurosceptics stances, however, it must also be considered that TOP 09 was formed by Miroslav Kalusek (who broke off from KDU–ČSL) and Karel Schwarzenberg. Thus although TOP 09 technically fits into the mode of a new party (having been established in 2009) it has much deeper ties to older parties than other parties that were founded in a similar time period. It is then, not surprising that although they are a new party, they maintain a pro-European platform.

ČSSD

ČSSD's 2006 manifesto discusses the role of the EU in protecting the citizens and ensuring a higher quality of life. According to the 2010 manifesto, a strong Europe and a strong Czech Republic are synonymous (*Silná Evropská unie znamená silnou Českou republiku, a silná, prosperující ČR posiluje Evropskou unii*). This assertion is especially interesting in light of the literature that purports EU membership implies a loss (at least on some level) of sovereignty. In 2006, at least according to members of ČSSD, this loss of sovereignty was beneficial for the Czech Republic.

ČSSD's 2013 election program emphasizes that the problems of Europe need to be solved with the other EU member-states. Most interestingly the voting program has a sentence in bold, which tells voters that the current crisis is not a sign of the end of the European project, but rather a challenge to get back to the roots of the European Community (***Evropský projekt nejen že se nevyčerpal, ale současná krize je naopak výzvou vrátit se zpět ke kořenům.***) As an older party, this is not surprising that ČSSD would have such strong pro-European stances. However, looking at the other hypotheses, ČSSD is both rural and less educated. In light of these two demographic features it is surprising that ČSSD is pro-European. Age of the party appears to be a more important factor in determining a party's likelihood to be Eurosceptic as it relates most directly with that party's exposure to the system and how much they have worked within that system (the obvious outlier is KSČM).

KSČM

KSČM's 2013 voting program expresses a feeling of unequal footing with the other EU member-states. Furthermore they say that they reject the democratic deficit that they perceive is currently happening in the EU (*Cílevědomě odmítat rozsáhlou byrokratizaci a přetrvávající deficit demokracie v politickém rozhodování EU a odstranit je.*) Use of this type of language to

discuss the Czech Republic's place in the EU is unsurprising considering KSČM was the only mainstream party to oppose membership in 2004, one of the principal reasons for doing so being a fear of a loss of sovereignty.

Although KSČM represents an exception in that they are an older party who is Eurosceptic, this is not shocking when the party's history is taken into account. As the legacy party of the Communist Party that was once in power during the Communist Era, KSČM is (along with Moldova's Communist Party) one of the only former Communist Parties that has retained Communist as part of its title. The retention of ties to the old regime ensured that KSČM were political outsiders in the 1990s and early 2000s as new leaders sought to reform the image of the Czech Republic and relinquish its ties to communism. The hypothesis that newer political parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic is formed on the supposition that newer parties are more disconnected with government and lack familiarity with the EU. Because KSČM has been political a outsider since the fall of communism, it is not surprising that even though they are not a new party they are Eurosceptic. KSČM's position as a less educated and more suburban party also fits in with the hypotheses of parties that are most likely to be Eurosceptic.

KDU-ČSL

In their 2013 voting program KDU-ČSL is similarly pro-European, advocating for an expansion of the EU and further integration. Most interestingly the front page of the voting program says "Do you want to be like Germany? Vote like Germans!" (*Chcete se mít jako v Německu? Volte jako v Německu!*). Especially as it is placed in such a prominent place in the voting program this language is striking.

Use of this language is interesting in light of the fact that KDU-ČSL is a rural based party. Although KDU-ČSL is a pro-European party, the party worker interviewed stated that they

often encounter pushback from members who are more Eurosceptic. Language like this is used to highlight the positive aspects of life in Europe. As a bordering state, Czechs often look to Germany as a standard (for jobs, lifestyle, quality of goods). Many of the Eurosceptic parties use language of recapturing national identity in order to have a better quality of life in the Czech Republic, however, KDU-ČSL takes a different approach appealing to Czechs to vote for their party because they are also popular in Germany (Angela Merkel's party). Use of this language is also striking when considering Czech's history and what Rishoj describes as their creation of identity in opposition to a foreign 'other.' In their voting program KDU-ČSL is taking the opposite approach by embracing ties with Germany. By highlighting positive aspects of European life, KDU-ČSL may be attempting to assuage rural voters as to the benefits of voting for a pro-European party.

ODS

In their approach to the European Union, ODS describes themselves as realists. They explain that they wish to remain in the EU, but that does not mean that they will blindly accept everything from Brussels. ODS says that all legislation from Brussels will have to be analyzed with 'Czech eyes' (*Každý prvek evropské integrace budeme poměřovat českýma očima*). This demonstrates the nationalistic nature of Eurosceptic language. The assertion that EU issues will be analyzed from the Czech perspective serves to assert Czech autonomy.

Although ODS is neither new (founded in 1991), rural, nor less educated ODS maintains a 'soft' Eurosceptic stance. This can be largely attributed to the influence of Former President Klaus who was one of the first major figures to brand himself as a 'Euro-realist.' Although this seems to confront the hypotheses, it is important to remember that as a party, ODS does not recommend a full withdrawal from the EU. This 'soft' Eurosceptic platform (as opposed to those

of Úsvit and Svobodní who call for a full withdrawal) is then perhaps more understandable in light of the hypotheses.

Svobodní

Svobodní's 2013 voting program moves beyond the language of 'democratic deficit' and rather refers to the actions of the EU as 'undemocratic conditions' (*nedemokratické poměry*). They continue that rather than foster European ideals of freedom, democracy, and human decency, Svobodní declares that the EU destroys these values. According to Svobodní, the EU goes against common sense and the interest of the citizens it is supposed to serve. Ultimately Svobodní's voting program places them firmly in the hard-Eurosceptic platform as they support a full withdrawal from the EU (*Proto Svobodní navrhuji hlasování o vystoupení z Evropské unie a jednoznačně doporučují, aby Česká republika z EU vystoupila*). As a newer party, Svobodní's hardline Eurosceptic stance is in line with the hypothesis about newer political parties being more likely to adopt Eurosceptic platforms. However, their urban/suburban base confronts the hypothesis that rural parties are the most likely to be Eurosceptic. This may point again to the idea that out of the three hypotheses age of the party is the strongest predictor for Euroscepticism.

Piráti

In their platforms regarding the 2018 presidential election, Piráti recommend that the President support EU membership. Furthermore they want the future president to coordinate their international politics with other EU member-states. Ultimately Piráti want a president who will be simultaneously integral and critical of the EU (*bude kritickou, ale pevnou součástí Evropské unie*). This assertion reflects what was vocalized by members of both SZ and TOP 09, that there is no room for critiquing the EU and being considered Eurosceptic. By the parameters

of this study, Piráti would be considered ‘soft’ Eurosceptic due to the nature of their critiques; however, this calls into question the utility of such a label if views on the EU are not binary. As a newer party, again, Piráti supports the hypothesis that new parties are the most likely to support Eurosceptic platforms. However, as an urban/suburban party Piráti pushes against the hypothesis that rural parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic.

SZ

SZ’s 2006 manifesto emphasizes that the EU is primarily a peace project (*Evropská unie je historicky jedinečný projekt založený na myšlence trvalého míru*) (the worker that I spoke with emphasized that SZ has not had any significant changes in their EU policy since accession). SZ’s 2013 voting program is similarly optimistic about the role of the EU in Czech life. As with the 2006 manifesto, the language of SZ’s voting program emphasized the EU’s role as a peace project and platform for the advancement of human rights. In contrast to other parties like ODS which have a more restrained support for the EU, SZ says that they seek further integration with the EU (*usilujeme o další politickou integraci Evropské unie*). As a well-established (founded in Czechoslovakia in 1989), urban, and well-educated party, SZ’s pro-European platforms support all three hypotheses as to which parties are most likely to be Eurosceptic.

Úsvit

The language that Úsvit uses to oppose the EU in their party’s program is mostly focused around financial issues. They state that they are against any kind of taxation from the EU and they oppose bailing out any member-states that are failing financially. Although Úsvit says that they support alliances between states, they oppose the idea that the Czech Republic has to orient their interests around a superpower—regardless of if its Moscow, Berlin or Brussels (*Jsme proti „orientaci“ zahraniční politiky na kteroukoli velmoc, ať už jejím sídlem je Moskva, Berlín,*

Brusel nebo jakékoli jiné místo v zahraničí). This language invokes periods of historical occupation (under Nazi Germany and later the USSR) and relates EU membership to these times of oppression. This reflects the literature such as Rishøj's work on the role that nationalism plays in Euroscepticism. As a newer party Úsvit supports the hypothesis that newer parties are most likely to be Eurosceptic. It is important to note that Úsvit and Svobodní were both founded by the same man, Tommio Okamura, and are both imprinted with his personal politics. This points to the importance of influential figures in determining party policy, as has also been demonstrated by Klaus' influence on ODS.

SPO

In their 2015 party program express frustration with the ways in which globalization occurs in smaller states such as the Czech Republic in which they must be more concerned with alliances. Because of this SPO acknowledges the reasons why membership was initially appealing to the Czech Republic, but that there are now many problems within the EU. While SPO believes that EU (along with NATO) membership is important, they cannot be relied on entirely to solve the Czech Republic's problems. SPO supports both hypotheses about newer and rural parties being more likely to be Eurosceptic. SPO also points to the influence of powerful personalities on a party's political agenda, as it was founded by current Czech President Miloš Zeman (another fierce critic of the EU). While Zeman has longstanding ties with Czech government his previous party was the pro-European ČSSD, thus SPO represents a significant shift in terms of European policy.

Summary

Through an analysis of party platforms it is evident that there is a relationship between age of party and that party's likelihood of adopting Eurosceptic platforms. Not only are newer

parties more likely to be Eurosceptic, but also are more likely to adopt extreme Eurosceptic views and use extreme language in their voting programs. This is exemplified by ODS' assertion that they are realists, as opposed to Úsvit and Svobodní's harsher words about the EU's democratic deficit. These platforms, however, do not indicate a strong relationship between less educated or rural party members and likelihood of Eurosceptic platforms.

Interview Data:

The following is a summary of interviews conducted with members of Úsvit, KDU-ČSL, TOP 09, and SZ. As it pertains to the three major hypotheses of this study, these parties make up a representative sample of parties across the spectrum as Úsvit is far-right, TOP 09 and KDU-ČSL are center-right, and SZ is center-left. Furthermore this set represents samples of both old (SZ and KDU-ČSL) and newer parties (Úsvit and TOP 09). These parties furthermore represent both parties with rural (KDU-ČSL) and urban (TOP 09, Úsvit and SZ) constituencies. There was also representation from parties with less educated (KDU-ČSL) and highly educated (TOP 09 and SZ) bases.

Participants were asked a series of questions concerning their party's relationship with the EU, with other parties, and with their constituents. Some of the questions asked include:

Party Make-up

1. What are the basic platforms of your party? Can you summarize what your party stands for in general?
2. Where do you place your party on the political spectrum? What is your relationship with other parties?
3. What is the demographic make-up of your party? Why are people drawn to your party?
4. What issues are your party's members most concerned with?
5. What role do your constituents have in shaping party policy? Do they contribute to your party manifesto?

EU Specific

1. Has your party's stance towards the EU changed?

2. How do you talk about European issues with your constituents? Are there any slogans, or language that you use with constituents when talking about Europe?
3. How active are your constituents around EU issues? Does this shape your platforms?
4. Has voters' level of interest in the EU changed over time?
5. In general, how well informed are your members about the EU? Where do your members typically get their information on the EU from?

Euroscepticism

6. How do you define Euroscepticism?
7. Where does Euroscepticism come from (the people, elites, etc)?
8. What kinds of people are more likely to identify as Eurosceptic?
9. What opinion do you think most Czechs have of the EU? How does your party appeal to these opinions?
10. Where do you think the future of the Czech Republic's relationship with the EU lies? How do you think the Brexit will affect the Czech Republic's relationship with the EU? How has it changed voters' views of the EU?
11. How do you think EU membership shapes domestic politics?
12. *Do you consider your party to be Eurosceptic? What do Eurosceptic parties usually stand for?*

Demographics:

Education:

Of the parties interviewed, only KDU-ČSL discussed how they communicated with less educated members. Although they do not make up the entirety of KDU-ČSL's base, the worker's comments provides interesting insight into the fears of less educated, Eurosceptic voters. The member from KDU-ČSL further elaborated that there are differences between their less and more educated members on issues such as Syrian migration to the Czech Republic. He explained that less educated members are typically against accepting refugees, while more educated are open to it. This points to deeper cleavages within parties between elites and members. While KDU-ČSL may have less educated members, their official party policy is pro-European. This disconnect between educated and less educated views on European issues within the same party reflects that age of the party being a more important factor in determining likelihood of Euroscepticism. Furthermore although there are less educated party members, they are not

typically creating party policy. It was difficult to find reliable data for the education levels of every party; this is especially true for the newer far-right parties as well as for the Piráti. This may be due to a lack of reliable information available due to the parties' relative newness.

Rural/Urban Divide:

Out of the parties interviewed, the rural urban divide also does not have a strong impact on the party's likelihood to adopt a Eurosceptic platform. The most rural party interviewed- KDU-ČSL has an officially Euro-optimist stance. While this does not mean that every member shares in this view, at least officially, the rural base has not affected the party's platforms. When interviewed, the worker from KDU-ČSL, said that at local party meetings they often have to assuage members' fears about increasing integration (especially as it pertains for EU quotas for accepting refugees). The lack of a rural/urban divide along party lines does not necessarily mean that there are not differences between rural and urban voters in the Czech Republic. Rural/ urban divides are not necessarily reflected in a party's stance, however, rural voters within a party are more likely to be opposed to the European Union. This suggests that voters are perhaps attracted to a pro-European, rural-based party (such as KDU-ČSL) for other reasons other than that party's position on the EU. This could perhaps also suggest that rural-based parties are not serving their constituents well in this area, a possible opening for a more Eurosceptic rural party to enter the scene. . Like many national parties KDU-ČSL is headquartered in Prague, and as such those who wield the most power are not themselves rural party members.

Other Demographic Information:

The representative from SZ emphasized the number of female members and that most of their members join the party because of environmental issues. TOP 09 emphasized that people most often join parties because of local issues, rather than national or international, this could

help explain gaps between elite views and member views. Furthermore people join parties because of personal relationships with existing member. This also serves as a reminder that people join parties for reasons beyond that party's stance on the EU, which may help explain why hypotheses do not always line up with realities of rural/urban divide, education, etc.

Age of Party:

One of the central hypotheses was that newer parties were more likely to adopt Eurosceptic platforms as a means by which to gain attention in the political landscape. From asking party-workers about their perceptions and working relationships with other parties, it is seen that five of the six parties founded in the last ten years are Eurosceptic. This is consistent with findings in the table and platforms found on party websites. While Euroscepticism is a device used by parties in order to gain attention, this is not a device used only by new parties. Furthermore not all new parties adopted Eurosceptic platforms. TOP 09, a party that has existed since 2009, is pro-European. Other newer parties, such as Úsvit, are firmly Eurosceptic, however, the Communist Party has longstanding ties to Euroscepticism. Although the Communist Party represents a departure from the norm, as well as Klaus' slightly Eurosceptic ODS, the finding that five of the six parties that were found to be either slightly or firmly Eurosceptic were founded within the last twenty-six years is significant. It is especially interesting in light of the fact that five out of the six of these parties were founded after the Czech Republic entered the European Union; this demonstrates a growth of Euroscepticism in party life.

Five out of the six parties that were founded in the last ten years have at least a somewhat Eurosceptic platform. This supports the central hypothesis that newer parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic. Of those new parties that are not Eurosceptic, TOP 09 formed out of KDU-ČSL.

Therefore, while TOP 09 is a newer party, it has roots in a more established political party, which may help explain why it is not Eurosceptic. This finding is particularly important in light of the fact that the Czech Republic has low party stability. Thus we may see a growth in not only Euroscepticism among Czech citizens, but also an increase in the number of Eurosceptic parties participating in coming elections.

Communication Between Public and Elites

Because of the discrepancies between official party policy and that which members believe, party members were asked how they communicate with party members about their policies and what influence members had in shaping policy. Most parties hold some form of local meetings where leaders explain policy and members can propose new ideas. Furthermore most parties develop policy through expert groups. A TOP 09 worker said, however, that these old-fashioned structures of holding these community meetings are not effective now because members now have direct access to party elites. It is now more difficult to mobilize constituents to attend these meetings and have productive conversations, as they now can contact representatives from home. They elaborated that because of this, the party is now more open with members than in the past.

The worker from KDU-ČSL said that the EU has not typically been a major topic for members in these meetings. Recently, however, constituents have been concerned with the EU as it pertains to the refugee crisis. The KDU-ČSL member also admitted that their party did not do a good job of explaining what the EU actually does with their members. A member from the Green Party asserted that politicians actually love the EU because the Czech Republic still gets more money from it than they give in, if this is true, then this illustrates a gap that exists between elites and members. As these answers come from Euro-optimist parties, it is most interesting how

KDU-ČSL is communicating due to the acknowledgement of their constituents' unease around European issues.

Public Knowledge

Parties across the spectrum lamented the lack of public knowledge about both European issues and the role of the EU itself. The representative from TOP 09 explained that this problem could stem from the fact that there is no civic education in schools that teach students about the functions of the EU. Once students leave school, these low levels of knowledge can lead to greater susceptibility to believing misinformation about the EU. The representative from TOP 09 said that implementing this type of education could be a problem because this type of education was abused during the communist period. Only the representative from SZ said that his party's members were well informed, this demonstrates across the spectrum how party-workers do not have faith in the levels of education of their constituents on European issues, however, little is being done to combat this. This issue was mentioned at TOP 09, a party with more educated members; this lack of education seems to be an issue across the political spectrum as it occurs in public schools. As such, it does not appear that lack of institutionalized education about the EU has a direct effect on an individual's likelihood to be Eurosceptic, however, there may be a connection between how far one continues in one's education and their desire to learn more about the function of the government (including the EU).

What is Euroscepticism?

When asked to define Euroscepticism, party representatives were hesitant. As oversimplification of issues is a problem that pro-European parties have with the Eurosceptic camp, it makes sense that they would not want to reduce the issue of Euroscepticism down to a sound bite. Those interviewed expressed that there are many different kinds of Euroscepticism

and that it has existed in the Czech Republic since before the referendum for EU membership (mostly bolstered by the Communist Party and ODS leader Klaus). The representative from KDU-ČSL asserted that Euroscepticism is fear tactics connected with misinformation.

The representative from KDU-ČSL also expressed that the Eurosceptics may have a louder voice than their actual representation due to their active online presence. SZ asserted that a lot of the Euroscepticism comes from unrealistic expectations upon entering the EU; Czechs thought that joining the EU would solve all of their problems and when it did not they began to question membership. The biggest problem with Euroscepticism according to SZ was that Eurosceptics fail to challenge their own ideas, however, this representative was the most willing of the pro-European parties that I spoke to talking with Eurosceptics and trying to understand why they believe what they believe. Lack of desire on the part of the parties to label Euroscepticism demonstrates the difficulty in defining it. While Euroscepticism is generally considered to be critical view of the EU, the parties interviewed did not seem to want to define the term. On the Eurosceptic side, however, Úsvit say that half of their members want to leave immediately and half are waiting to see what the EU will do about the Syrian migration crisis.

Is Euroscepticism realistic?

Euro-optimist parties see Euroscepticism as an encumbrance to dealing with the issues that are facing the Czech Republic. While Euroscepticism is critical of the EU, according to pro-European parties, they rarely provide substantive critiques of how they would like to change the EU. The representative from SZ elaborated on this, saying that Eurosceptics do not say what they want back from the EU; this leads him to question whether or not Euroscepticism is a genuine outlook or just employed for political points. This statement supports the alternative hypothesis that political parties are intentionally using Eurosceptic platforms to attract voters. Furthermore

there lack plans for what would happen if the Czech Republic were to leave the EU.

Euroscepticism, said the representative of TOP 09, seems to be a trend, but it remains to be seen if it will be able to provide solutions. They elaborated that four years ago nobody wanted to say they are Eurosceptic, preferring instead the term Euro-realist, but are now embracing the label. This fits with the hypothesis that newer political parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic; beyond this they are willing to embrace the label. Newer parties are shown not only to be more likely to be Eurosceptic, but also more likely to embrace the term. Both Úsvit and Svobodní embrace the term, whereas more established Eurosceptic parties like ODS favor terminology such as Euro-realist. As new parties are established, they are doing so in a time where there are not the same stigmas on the label that there was during the time of accession. Indeed the label 'Eurosceptic,' for some, may have positive connotations of a party that will fight government corruption.

The worker from TOP 09 elaborated that it is difficult now to find Euro-optimist party because being a Euro-optimist is like telling people not to vote for you. This statement underlines the widespread public Euroscepticism, it also demonstrated the likelihood that new parties will continue to adopt Eurosceptic stances, as they are appealing in light of current political trends. It also provides evidence for the alternative hypothesis that political parties are fanning Eurosceptic fears in order to get votes.

Summary

These interviews provide a more nuanced picture of the language presented through the previous section analyzing party platforms. Especially in terms of education and rural/urban divide, these interviews reveal that there are often differences between less educated and rural party members and that party's official stance. This demonstrates that although rural and less

educated constituents may hold Eurosceptic views, this is not always reflected in party membership. By asking party members about other demographic features, what their ‘typical’ member looks, serves as a reminder that there are many reasons why an individual chooses to join a party. These cleavages may be related to lack of effective communication between elites and members, as well as an overall lack of public education on the EU. These differences between level of education and party’s likelihood of Euroscepticism may also be due to the fact that the most reliable data has come from older parties. Older parties are likelier to have more loyal members. This is especially true with a party such as KDU-ČSL, which has such longstanding ties within the Czech system. Indeed, as Vlachova’s study suggest that KDU-ČSL is one of the few Czech parties with stronger ties, it would make sense that members have stronger party loyalty beyond that party’s position on the EU.




Table 2

Other Materials:

David Povolný at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic created the proceeding chart. The chart discusses the eight most successful parties in Brno (the Czech Republic's second largest city) in the 2014 election. Apart from Žít Brno, which is a local party, all other parties listed on the chart are included in this study, and as such it provides an important local example of the successes of seven of the parties included in this project (Ano, ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODS, SZ, KSČM, and TOP 09). Žít Brno should not be completely ignored, however, as it garnered 11.6% of the vote in Brno in 2014 (the third most successful party). This begs the questions as to if the three central hypotheses of these study- whether new parties, rural parties, and less educated parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic- are applicable also to regional parties as well.

According to this chart the typical member of Ano, ČSSD, and KSČM have a high school education (*středoškolské vzdělání*). The chart differentiates, however, between Ano, ČSSD as having been high school with graduation (*s maturitou*), whereas KSČM does not have that stipulation. Of these three parties only KSČM has Eurosceptic platforms, however, it is significant that of the parties listed KSČM has the lowest level of education and are known as the party with the longest standing ties to Euroscepticism (having been opposed to the 2004 referendum for membership). Typical voters from KDU-ČSL, ODS, SZ, and TOP 09 are all listed as having college education (*vysokoškolské vzdělání*). Of those parties only ODS has any ties with Euroscepticism.

Of note, this chart also discusses how typical voters from each of the parties listed in the last election. This speaks to the low party identification in the Czech Republic, the fact that voters move between parties from election to election. In the last election Ano voters were most likely to vote Ano, ČSSD, or TOP 09. KDU-ČSL voters were previously likely to have voted

KDU-ČSL, TOP 09, or Ano. ODS were most likely to have voted ODS or TOP 09. SZ (green party) voters were previously likely to have voted SZ, TOP 09, ODS, or KDU-ČSL. Žít Brno (the local Brno party) voters were likely to have previously voted SZ, TOP 09, or for a smaller party. Of the parties listed only ČSSD and TOP 09 have their current voters having voted exclusively for their own party in the previous election as well. This speaks to the flexibility of voters.


Also speaking to the lack of longstanding ties to whom they will vote for, the chart discusses when voters made their electoral decisions. Ano and SZ are described as having decided whom they were voting for in the last two weeks (rozhodl se v posledních dvou týdnech). ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODS, and KSČM voters have known for a while how they would vote (dlouhodobě rozhodnutý, koho bude volit). There is no data available on the chart concerning when TOP 09 voters decided how they would vote. As ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODS, and KSČM are the oldest parties in the Czech Republic, it is not surprising that their voters would have decided whom they were voting for more in advance. Indeed this confirms Vlachova's study which found that ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODS, and KSČM had longer standing ties in the Czech political system, and therefore voters had stronger associations with them than with other parties.

Summary

The longstanding decisions of voters from parties such as ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, ODS, and KSČM help to explain why there may be a difference between party member's personal views on the EU and that party's official platform. Although SZ is not a newer party, as per Vlachova's study, they are not one of the parties with longstanding ties in the Czech system. Furthermore the flexibility of voters to change from party to party between elections, demonstrates the ease with

which new parties may enter electoral competition. If many people are choosing a different party every election, then there is a greater opportunity for newer parties than in a system in which more parties had longstanding ties. If newer parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic, this may mean that there will be more room for Eurosceptic voting in future elections.

2013 Czech Presidential Election, Final Round



Map 1

Case Study: 2013 Presidential Election

The 2013 presidential election between Miloš Zeman and Karel Schwarzenberg provides an important case study for contextualizing the rural/urban divide in the Czech Republic. The areas on the above map in blue include Prague, Brno, Plzeň, and Ostrava, which are four of the five largest cities in the Czech Republic. Suburban centers of České Budějovice, Hradec Králové, and Liberec are also blue. Schwarzenberg's blue urban centers and Zeman's red countryside, demonstrate a clear distinction between rural and urban voting preferences. While on a party-by-party basis, membership was not necessarily an indicator of a party developing Eurosceptic platforms; the results from the 2013 presidential election demonstrate a clear difference between rural and urban populations. Zeman's election also disputes the assertion made by Spanje and de Vreese that while people may be inclined towards Euroscepticism, they will still elect pro-European parties.

The presidential race between Zeman and Schwarzenberg exemplifies the ability of personalities to quickly form new parties. Zeman's SPO and Schwarzenberg's TOP 09 were both formed in 2009. This is also seen in the party Ano, which was founded in 2013 by Andrej Babiš, the second richest person in the Czech Republic in 2009. Both far right Úsvit and Svobodní were formed by businessman Tomio Okamura. As more Eurosceptic figures gain traction in the political system, there could be new parties forming around Eurosceptic personalities. This demonstrates that new parties are both quickly formed and successful. As has been established by this study, with new parties being more likely to be Eurosceptic, there is a greater chance of seeing Eurosceptic parties successfully participating in future elections.

Ultimately the 2013 presidential election in the Czech Republic exemplifies not only the infiltration of Euroscepticism into the highest levels of domestic politics in the Czech Republic,

but also a clear rural/ urban divide when it comes to voters. This divide may not necessarily be reflected in specific party platforms, but for rural voters there is a clear preference towards Euroscepticism.

Summary

The 2013 Presidential Election provides an important example in understanding the rural/urban divide in the Czech Republic. This study hypothesized that parties with more rural memberships would be more likely to adopt Eurosceptic platforms was proven false, however, the results of this election demonstrate that there is a clear rural/urban divide in Czech voting. The results of the 2013 election follow an urban- pro-EU, rural-anti-EU model. Furthermore the competition of two newer parties in the election demonstrates why attention needs to be paid to newer parties, not only are they more likely to be Eurosceptic, but they have proven to be successful in elections.

Conclusion

Through the interviews conducted, it became apparent that there is a gap between party workers' understanding of the EU and that of their constituents. This gap between official party platforms and public opinion on the EU is reflective of what several parties lamented about the lack of communication between parties and people about the functions of the EU. Party workers explained that they often do not engage with constituents effectively in this because it is difficult to talk about the technical aspects of the EU, whereas sensational stories about 'bad Brussels' are easy to produce. Still this seems to be a contradiction in an age where parties have a greater ability to communicate directly with constituents through new technologies.

The most significant of the three hypotheses tested is the age of the party. As five of the six parties founded in the last ten years have adopted Eurosceptic platforms, newer parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic. This is important in light of the fact that new parties are incredibly successful, with the 2013 Presidential Election serving as an excellent example. Knowing that newer parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic and that they are attractive option for voters shows that we need to pay attention to this trend. Additionally, newer parties are not only more likely to be Eurosceptic, but to adopt more extreme Eurosceptic stance than older Eurosceptic parties. Of the seven Eurosceptic parties examined in the study four scored higher than eight on the ten-point scale of Euroscepticism (with six serving as the threshold for Euroscepticism). Of those four, three three are newer parties. Out of the five newer parties surveyed three have a score of eight or higher. As newer Eurosceptic parties become more established, more embedded in government, it would be expected that they would soften some of their more extreme Eurosceptic stances.

A study of why new parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic is particularly important in the Czech Republic, as there is low party stability overall. At least for the near future we can expect this trend of newer Eurosceptic parties to continue. What this study does not explore, however, is party extinction. Party instability also means that parties die out faster, how this applies directly to Eurosceptic parties needs to be further explored.

Level of education and rural-ness both have an effect on an individual's likelihood of being Eurosceptic, however, party elites tend to overrule these opinions in the creation of party platforms. While there is not always a strong link between rural voters' Euroscepticism and the likelihood of a party with a rural base adopting a Eurosceptic platform, the case of the 2013 Presidential Election demonstrates that there is a clear rural/urban divide in the Czech Republic.

This is especially important when considering the pro-European stances of Schwarzenberg and the Euroscepticism of Zeman.

There is little to suggest that parties with less educated members are more likely to adopt Eurosceptic platforms, as parties with less educated members exist with similar frequency on both ends of the spectrum. The parties with the most reliable data for on the issue of education, however, were older parties. As has been explained these older parties are the ones with the most developed member loyalty, so this may help to explain possible differences between party member's personal stance on the EU and that of their party. Lack of correlation between education and Euroscepticism in parties may also point to these gaps between members and workers. Those who are developing party platforms, while they may be influenced by constituents, are typically highly educated and working in large cities (usually Prague), thus there may be some inconsistencies due to the distance between party members and workers.

This study has looked at factors beyond a party's position on the left-right spectrum in order to provide a fuller picture of which features Eurosceptic parties share. In doing this it is seen that in the future particular attention needs to be paid to newer political parties, as they have a greater likelihood of being Eurosceptic and can quickly become competitive in elections. Education and rural memberships are not reliable indicators of Eurosceptic platforms. It is imperative to understand Euroscepticism, as it is a trend that has seen greater successes across Europe. In the United States, the election of President Donald Trump can be seen as an analogous trend, rejecting the existing power structures. These similarities must not be overlooked as in the aftermath of the American election, President Klaus praised then President-elect Trump and expressed admiration for many of his policy aims. Thus it is critical that we

understand which kinds of parties are more likely to be Eurosceptic, as Eurosceptic actors are having greater influence on policy decisions.

Appendix

Political Parties Key (parties listed in alphabetical order):

ANO	<i>Akce nespokojených občanů</i>	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens
ČSSD	<i>Česká strana sociálně demokratická</i>	Czech Social Democratic Party
KDU-ČSL	<i>Křesťanská a demokratická unie –</i> Christian and Democratic Union –	Československá strana lidová Czechoslovak People's Party
KSČM	<i>Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy</i>	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
ODS	<i>Občanská demokratická strana</i>	Civic Democratic Party
Piráti	<i>Česká pirátská strana</i>	Czech Pirate's Party
SPO	<i>Strana Práv Občanů</i>	Party of Civic Rights
Svobodní	<i>Strana svobodných občanů</i>	Party of Free Citizens
SZ	<i>Strana zelených</i>	Green Party
TOP 09	<i>Tradice Odpovědnost Prosperita</i>	Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity 09
Úsvit	<i>Úsvit - Národní koalice</i>	Dawn- National Coalition

References

- Anderson, B. R. (1991). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Bardi, L., Rhodes, M., & Nello, S. S. (2002). Enlarging the European Union: Challenges to and from Central and Eastern Europe--Introduction. *International Political Science Review*, 23(3), 227-233.
- Baun, M., Durr, J., Marek, D., & Saradin, P. (2006). The Europeanization of Czech Politics: The Political Parties and the EU Referendum. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* *JCMS: J Common Market Studies*, 44(2), 249-280.
- Bernhard, M., & Karakoç, E. (2011). Moving West or Going South?: Economic Transformation and Institutionalization in post-communist Party Systems. *Comp Politics Comparative Politics*, 44(1), 1-20.
- Bryant, C. C. (2009). *Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Burkart, P. (2014). *Pirate politics: the new information policy contests*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Conti, N. (2011). The Radical Right in Europe, between Slogans and Voting Behavior. *Análise Social*, 46(201), 633-652. Retrieved February 3, 2016.
- ČSSD. (2011). Sociální demokracie pro 21. století. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from http://www.cssd.cz/data/files/socialni_demokracie_pro_21_stoleti.pdf
- D. (n.d.). PublicOpinion - European Commission. Retrieved March 06, 2017, from <https://ec.europa.eu/COMMFfrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/19/groupKy/102>
- Daddow, O. J. (2006). Euroscepticism and the culture of the discipline of history. *Review of International Studies Rev. Int. Stud.*, 32(02), 309.
- Duff, A. (2012). On Dealing with Euroscepticism. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(1), 140-152.
- Esparza, D. (2010). National identity and the Other: Imagining the EU from the Czech Lands. *Nationalities Papers*, 38(3), 413-436.
- F. F. (n.d.). Resortní program | ANO, bude líp. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from <http://www.anobudeli.cz/cs/o-nas/program/resortni-program/>
- Guzi, M., & Franta, M. (2008). Unequal Access to Higher Education in the Czech Republic: The Role of Spatial Distribution of Universities. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1113784
- Hakhverdian, A., Elsas, E. V., Brug, W. V., & Kuhn, T. (2013). Euroscepticism and education: A longitudinal study of 12 EU member states, 1973–2010. *European Union Politics*, 14(4), 522-541. doi:10.1177/1465116513489779
- Hanley, S. (2004). A Nation of Sceptics? The Czech EU Accession Referendum of 13–14 June 2003. *West European Politics*, 27(4), 691-715.
- Havlík, V. (2011). A breaking-up of a pro-European consensus: Attitudes of Czech political parties towards the European integration (1998–2010). *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 44(2), 129-147.
- Havlík, V., & Voda, P. (2016). The Rise of New Political Parties and Re-Alignment of Party Politics in the Czech Republic. *Acta Politologica*, 8(2), 119-144. Retrieved from <http://acpo.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/001183.pdf>
- Havlík, V., & Vykoupilová, H. (2008). Two dimensions of the Europeanization of election

- programs: The case of the Czech Republic. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 41(2), 163-187.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2008). A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. *British Journal of Political Science* Brit. J. Polit. Sci., 39(01), 1
- Innes, A. (2002). Party Competition in Postcommunist Europe: The Great Electoral Lottery. *Comparative Politics*, 35(1), 85.
- KDU-ČSL. (2013). Volební Program KDU-ČSL 2013-2017. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from <http://www.kdu.cz/getattachment/6089d21c-eba3-4e8e-b390-1b922500af73/Volebni-program-pro-volby-do-poslanecke-snemovny-2.aspx>
- KSČM. (2013). PROGRAM PRO BUDOUCNOST. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from https://www.kscm.cz/sites/default/files/soubory/Program%20KS%C4%8CM/Volebni_program_KSCM_pro_volby_do_PS_PCR_2013.pdf
- Kaniok, P. (2014). The Party of Free Citizens: A Czech Single Issue Eurosceptic Party? *Středoevropské politické studie*, Brno: MPÚ, 16(1), 75-92.
- Klaus, V., & Hejma, O. (2012). *Europe: The shattering of illusions*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Koopmans, R. (2007). Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates. *European Journal of Political Research* Eur J Political Res, 46(2), 183-210.
- Kopecky, P., & Mudde, C. (2002). The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe. *European Union Politics*, 3(3), 297-326.
- Krejčí, P. J., & Machonin, P. (1998). *Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: a Laboratory for Social Change*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Lyons, P. (2007). 'It's the Economy, Stupid' Popular Support for EU Accession in the Czech Republic. *Czech Sociological Review*, 43(3), 523-560. Retrieved February 10, 2016.
- Magnette, P., & Nicolaïdis, K. (2004). Coping with the Lilliput Syndrome Large vs. Small Member States in the European Convention. *Politique européenne*, 13(2), 69. doi:10.3917/poeu.013.0069
- Mareš, Miroslav, and Pavel Pšeja. *Agrarian and Peasant Parties in the Czech Republic: History, Presence and Central European Context*. Masaryk University Information System. Masaryk University, 2007. Web.
- Mateju, P., & Vlachova, K. (1998). Values and Electoral Decisions in the Czech Republic. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 31(3), 249-269.
- Moravcsik, A. (2002). Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* JCMS: J Common Market Studies, 40(4), 603-624.
- Neumayer, L. (2008). Euroscepticism as a Political Label: The Use of European Union Issues in Political Competition in the New Member States. *European Journal of Political Research* Eur J Political Res, 47(2), 135-160.
- ODS. (2013). Volební Program. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from <http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/volebni-program-2013.pdf> <http://www.ods.cz/docs/programy/volebni-program-2013.pdf>
- OECD. (2014). *Education at a Glance 2014: Czech Republic* [Press release]. Retrieved April 17, 2017, from <https://www.oecd.org/edu/Czech%20Republic-EAG2014-Country-Note.pdf>
- Pirátská strana. (2016). Programové priority Pirátů pro volbu prezidenta republiky 2018. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from <https://www.pirati.cz/program/prezident2018>
- Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. A. (2011). *Communism's Shadow: Postcommunist Legacies*,

- Values, and Behavior. *Comp Politics Comparative Politics*, 43(4), 379-408.
- Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. A. (2012). Associated with the Past?: Communist Legacies and Civic Participation in Post-Communist Countries. *East European Politics & Societies*, 27(1), 45- 68.
- Pop-Eleches, G., & Tucker, J. A. (2014). Communist socialization and post-communist economic and political attitudes. *Electoral Studies*, 33, 77-89.
- Riishøj, S. (2007). Europeanization and Euroscepticism: Experiences from Poland and the Czech Republic. *Nationalities Papers*, 35(3), 503-535.
- SPO. (2015, November 7). PEVNÉ ČESKÉ KOŘENY: Otevřený střednědobý program. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from <http://www.spoz2013.cz/upload/program-spo---711-2015.pdf>
- Spanje, J. V., & Vreese, C. D. (2011). So what's wrong with the EU? Motivations underlying the Eurosceptic vote in the 2009 European elections. *European Union Politics*, 12(3), 405-429.
- Strana zelených. (2013). Volební program Strany zelených. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from http://www.zeleni.cz/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/program_Strana_zelenych_2013.pdf
- Surwillo, I., Henderson, K., & Lazaridis, G. (2010). Between Euroscepticism and Eurosupport: The Attitudes of Urban and Rural Populations in Poland 2000–2008. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 62(9), 1503-1525. doi:10.1080/09668136.2010.515796
- Svobodní. (2013). Politický program. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from <https://web.svobodni.cz/program/politicky-program>
- TOP 09. (2013). VOLBY 2013 DO POSLANECKÉ SNĚMOVNY. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from http://www.top09.cz/files/soubory/volebni-program-2013-do-poslanecke-snemovny_894.pdf
- Taggart, P., & Szczerbiak, A. (2004). Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe. *European Journal of Political Research Eur J Political Res*, 43(1), 1-27.
- Taggart, P. (1998). A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems. *European Journal of Political Research Eur J Political Res*, 33(3), 363-388.
- Tavits, M. (2013). *Post-Communist Democracies and Party Organization*. Cambridge University Press.
- Trampota, T. (n.d.). Czech Republic - Media Landscape. Retrieved March 22, 2017, from http://ejc.net/media_landscapes/czech-republic
- Tucker, J. A., Pacek, A. C., & Berinsky, A. J. (2002). Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes Toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(3), 557.
- Tverdova, Y., & Anderson, C. (2004). Choosing the West? Referendum choices on EU membership in east-central Europe. *Electoral Studies*, 23(2), 185-208.
- Usherwood, S., & Startin, N. (2012). Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 51(1), 1-16.
- Úsvit. (2016). Program strany | Úsvit - Národní Koalice. Retrieved January 17, 2017, from <http://www.usvitnarodnikoalice.cz/program-strany/>
- Vlachová, K. (2001). Party Identification in the Czech Republic: Inter-party Hostility and Party Preference. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 34(4), 479-499.

- Vries, C. E., & Edwards, E. E. (2009). Taking Europe To Its Extremes: Extremist Parties and Public Euroscepticism. *Party Politics*, 15(1), 5-28.
- Wilde, P. D., & Zürn, M. (2012). Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?*. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50, 137-153.

VITA

Kathryn Quinn O'Dowd grew up in Palm Desert, California. After graduating from Palm Desert High School in 2009, she went on to study at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In 2013 she earned B.A.'s in History and Mass Communications. Upon her graduation from university, she spent a year teaching English in Prague, Czech Republic. It was there that she began to study the Czech language and culture. From January 2015 she has been a graduate student at the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at the University of Texas at Austin.

Address: kqodowd@utexas.edu

This thesis was typed by the author.